Figure 1
From: How the incentive to contribute affects contributions in the one-shot public goods game
Contributions in the Public Goods Game depending on marginal per capita returns of investing in the group project (MPCR). (a) Average contributions over all ten rounds (every round was ‘one-shot’, i.e. participants interacted with new interaction partners every round), (b) Contribution in the first round only (in this round, there is no possibility that participants’ decisions were influenced by earlier rounds). Coloured rectangles indicate the fraction of individuals with an average contribution falling in the indicated range for each treatment (see legend). Black dots show average contribution rates for each treatment. The line shows the cooperation response to multiplication factor predicted by our models based on the data (for figure a, based on period 6; see Supplementary Materials for details of the statistical models). The shading around the line indicates the 95% confidence interval of the mean.
